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INTRODUCTION 
Unless a landowner manages to strike gold or oil on his or her 
property, the worth of that land “is not in the dirt itself,” but in how he 
or she may develop it.1 Because the permitted use provides the land with 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, in 
English, Drew University, 2007. The author thanks her friends and family for all their 
support these past three years.  
1 Donald R. Daines, Hanging On to What You Got, HILL WALLACK LLP, 
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value, local zoning classifications play a huge part in determining the 
value of any particular piece of property.2 Zoning designations are also 
“the foundation upon which an owner’s right to use the property is 
based.”3 In contrast, the overarching goal of zoning is to advance the 
common good and general welfare of the entire community, and 
sometimes the common good is not to permit the most advantageous 
economic use of land.4 As a result, the property rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community often come into conflict during the 
course of land development.5 
In balancing these two conflicting interests, courts are no longer 
likely to accept a mere recitation by a municipality that a zoning 
ordinance reasonably relates to the police power because it promotes the 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare.6 Today, courts are more 
likely to examine closely the particular purposes behind each zoning 
action to determine whether it truly achieves those stated purposes.7 One 
recent example of this increased judicial scrutiny of municipal zoning 
action is Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South Brunswick,8 
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a zoning 
amendment adopted by the Township was not only arbitrary and 
capricious, but also impermissible inverse spot zoning.9 While the 
dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on the judicially created 
doctrine of inverse spot zoning, others praised the decision for 
promoting rational and professional zoning and for breathing new life 
into individual property rights by adding to the arsenal available to 
landowners looking to defeat a municipality’s downzoning of their 
 
http://www.hillwallack.com/web-content/news/articles_040309.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2011). 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF ZONING AND LAND 
USE CONTROLS § 34.01(1) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES] (quoting Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n v. 
Schmidt, 83 S.W.3d 449, 455 (Ky. 2001)). 
5 See generally Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls: Balancing 
Public and Private Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629 (1999).  
6 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES, supra note 4. 
7 Id. 
8 Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008). 
9 Id. at 187. Inverse spot zoning occurs when a municipality “arbitrarily singles out a 
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.” Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978). 
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property.10 
This Note recognizes that the doctrine of inverse spot zoning was 
originally developed in response to the problems of zoning’s earlier era, 
and prior to the enactment of New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law.11 
However, it asserts that the majority in Riya Finnegan actually 
transformed the doctrine in a way that improves New Jersey land use 
jurisprudence by providing greater clarity and promoting better and 
more accurate decision-making by the courts. Part I provides a brief 
description of the inverse spot zoning doctrine and traces its presence in 
New Jersey case law prior to the Riya Finnegan decision. Part II 
supplies an overview of New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law and the 
Riya Finnegan decision. Part III examines the historical context of 
inverse spot zoning and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of 
the doctrine in Riya Finnegan. Finally, Part IV discusses the important 
competing interests at stake in a zoning challenge and explains the 
balance struck by the New Jersey Supreme Court between the broad 
zoning power granted to municipalities under the Municipal Land Use 
Law and judicial intervention. 
I. WHAT IS INVERSE SPOT ZONING? 
This Part explains the features of inverse spot zoning both 
generally and throughout New Jersey case law. The first subpart not 
only defines inverse spot zoning, but also compares it to traditional spot 
zoning and clarifies the meaning of its usage throughout this Note. The 
second subpart describes and traces its presence in New Jersey case law 
prior to the Riya Finnegan decision. 
a. In General 
Essentially, spot zoning is the zoning or rezoning of a particular 
piece of property or “spot” in a manner considerably different from 
surrounding properties.12 The term’s usage can produce some confusion 
 
10 See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 204; Daines, supra note 1; see also Editorial, Zoning 
Law and Master Plans, N.J. L.J., June 26, 2009.  
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -163 (West 2009). Section 40:55D-62 of New 
Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law states that the governing body of a municipality “may 
adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in whole or part is 
inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate” the Master Plan, provided that there is 
majority approval and that the body’s reasoning for the inconsistency is “set forth in a 
resolution and recorded in its minutes” upon adoption of the ordinance. Id. § 40:55D-62(a). 
12 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, SPOT ZONING § 38A.01(1) (Patrick J. Rohan & 
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because courts employ it in two different ways.13 In the narrower, legal 
sense, spot zoning is a designation used by courts to condemn a zoning 
action as per se invalid.14 However, when courts use the term in the 
broader, descriptive sense, it simply refers to the practice of rezoning a 
particular parcel of a land for a purpose that is significantly more or less 
restrictive than the surrounding zoning.15 The act of spot zoning is only 
invalid if a court finds it to be unjustified in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.16 Because New Jersey courts hold that zoning is 
automatically void if found to be spot zoning, this Note will focus on 
the term in its legal sense.17 
The typical spot zoning case begins when a municipality complies 
with a landowner’s request to develop his or her land in a manner barred 
by the current zoning scheme by passing an ordinance rezoning the 
property.18 A court will generally invalidate the zoning action as spot 
zoning if it “is designed to relieve a particular property from applicable 
zoning restrictions for the benefit of a particular property owner or 
specially interested party, to the detriment of other owners in the 
vicinity, and the community as a whole.”19 
Some courts differentiate between inverse or reverse spot zoning 
and traditional spot zoning.20 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City,21 the United States Supreme Court defined inverse spot 
zoning as “a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular 
parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring 
ones.”
22
 Thus, the difference between the two types of spot zoning is 
that in the classic spot zoning case, a particular lot is singled out for 
 
Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter SPOT ZONING]. 
13 See id.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., “Spot Zoning” — A Spot that Could be Removed from 
the Law, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 117, 121 (1995). 
18 SPOT ZONING, supra note 12. 
19 Id. (citations omitted) 
20 See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 250-51 (1954) 
(invalidating an amendment which in effect granted a variance as “spot zoning”). Cf. Seiber 
v. Laawe, 33 N.J. Super 115, 126 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1954); Guaclides v. Borough of 
Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super 405, 412 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). Both courts 
indicated that they would hold spot zoning invalid but did not find it in those particular 
cases because similarly situated property was treated alike. 
21 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
22 Id. at 132. 
WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:40 PM 
520 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
preferential treatment, while in the case of inverse spot zoning, a 
particular lot is singled out for zoning that is more restrictive.23 For 
example, courts have found impermissible inverse spot zoning where 
municipalities rezoned a particular parcel from multifamily to single-
family residential, commercial to residential, central business to 
highway commercial, heavy to light industrial, or industrial to 
residential.24 
Unlike traditional spot zoning, these types of amendments usually 
lead to economic disadvantage rather than advantage for the owner of 
the rezoned property.25 A court declares a zoning ordinance void as 
inverse spot zoning when it is “confiscatory or discriminatory to the 
owners of the subject properties without bearing a substantial 
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.”26 
Courts generally uphold a zoning amendment if it furthers the public 
interest and its benefits to the community outweigh the harm caused to 
the individual property owner, or if the municipality enacts the 
amendment as part of a comprehensive zoning plan intended to advance 
the general welfare and land use uniformity.27 In other words, a 
municipal zoning action that discriminates against an individual 
property owner must serve a police power purpose that outweighs the 
burden on the individual’s property rights or that furthers the 
community’s comprehensive land use plan. 
b.  New Jersey Case Law 
New Jersey case law defines traditional spot zoning as “the use of 
the zoning power to benefit particular private interests rather than the 
collective interests of the community.”28 The case law stresses that it is 
“the antithesis of . . . planned zoning.”29 The case law further states that 
the test is whether the zoning ordinance at issue was enacted “with the 
purpose or effect of” advancing a comprehensive zoning scheme or 
whether it was devised simply to benefit a particular lot through relief 
 
23 Reynolds, supra note 17, at 119. 
24 SPOT ZONING, supra note 12 § 38A.06(2). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. § 38A.06(1). 
27 Id. § 38A.06(3). 
28 Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 195 (2008) 
(quoting Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976)). 
29 See Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 134 (1965). 
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from a general zoning regulation.30 
Inverse spot zoning does not appear much throughout New Jersey 
case law. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s most extended discussion of 
inverse spot zoning took place in 1974 in Petlin Associates v. Township 
of Dover.31 In that case, a portion of a zoning district permitting retail 
uses included the plaintiff’s property, but after the plaintiff filed plans to 
build a department store, the municipality altered the zoning.32 Because 
the new zoning designation for the plaintiff’s property did not allow 
retail uses, the plaintiff challenged the rezoning.33 The court held the 
zoning amendment invalid as inverse spot zoning, emphasizing “that no 
real consideration was given to how the property would fit into an 
integrated and comprehensive zone plan” and that the zoning change 
was contrary to the recommendations of the Township’s planning 
engineer.34 
Three months later, in Odabash v. Mayor & Council of Dumont,35 
the court struck down a zoning amendment proscribing housing 
construction for the use of more than two families in any zone.36 As 
applied to the plaintiff’s property, the amendment made the property 
“an isolated island in the midst of apartment and business uses.”37 
Although the Appellate Division characterized the zoning action as 
inverse spot zoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in affirming that 
part of the decision, simply focused on the amendment’s arbitrary and 
unreasonable nature when applied to the plaintiff’s parcel.38 
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court has found some 
zoning revisions evidently aimed at preventing a proposed development 
to be permissible. For example, in response to local opposition to a 
plaintiff’s proposed Home Depot store, the municipality in Manalapan 
Realty, L.P. v. Township Committee of Manalapan39 enacted a zoning 
amendment that prohibited retail stores “engaged in the sale of lumber 
or building materials or storing, [from] displaying or selling materials 
 
30 Id. 
31 Petlin Assocs. V. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327 (1974). 
32 Id. at 328-30. 
33 Id. at 330. 
34 Id. at 331.  
35 Odabash v. Mayor  & Council of Dumont, 65 N.J. 115 (1974).  
36 Id. at 125. 
37 Id. at 122. 
38 Id. at 123-25. 
39 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995). 
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outside a completely enclosed building” within the zone encompassing 
plaintiff’s property.40 The Appellate Division held that the amendment 
was plainly not inverse spot zoning because the amendment affected not 
just one tract of land, but effectively every zoning district in the 
township.41 In order to be inverse spot zoning, the zoning revision would 
have to inflict “an arbitrary, unique burden on one tract of land.”42 
Although the inverse spot zoning issue was not before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the majority declared that the Township’s decision to 
ban the retailing of building materials could further legitimate goals and 
could not “categorically be adjudged an arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of the zoning power.”43 
II. NEW JERSEY’S MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW AND RIYA 
FINNEGAN 
This Part provides an overview of New Jersey’s Municipal Land 
Use Law and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Riya 
Finnegan. The first subpart reviews the statutory language pertinent to 
the Riya Finnegan decision, as well as the statute’s relevant legislative 
history. The second subpart provides a summary of the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Riya Finnegan. 
a.  New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law 
The New Jersey Legislature enacted the Municipal Land Use Law44 
(hereinafter “MLUL”) in 1975. The law was designed to be “a 
comprehensive codification and substantial revision” of the state’s 
several statutes related to municipal land use and building regulation.45 
 
40 Id. at 373 (quoting MANALAPAN, N.J., LAND USE AND DEV. ORDINANCE § 130.94 
(1991)).  
41 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 272 N.J. Super 1, 13-14 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
42 Id. at 14. 
43 Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 385-86 (1995) (quoting Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 371 (1987)). 
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -163 (West 2009).  
45 S. County and Municipal Government Comm.: Statement to S. No. 3054, 1975 Leg., 
2nd Sess. 1 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Statement to S. No. 3054]; see also Public Hearing on S. 
No. 3054 Before the S. County and Municipal Government Comm., 1975 Leg., 2nd Sess. 2 
(N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (statement of Sen. Martin L. Greenberg, Member, 
S. County and Municipal Government Comm.) (noting S. No. 3054 codified five basic land 
use statutes enacted at different times: Planning Acts, Zoning Enabling Acts, Official Map 
and Building Act, Plan Unit Development Act, and the Regional Planning Act). 
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A former president of the New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 
the entity that drafted the legislation, emphasized that New Jersey had 
not yet updated the enabling act it passed in 1928, and that numerous 
changes had occurred in land use since that time.46 He also stressed that 
the legislation’s drafters, in carefully examining all land use case law 
since 1928, hoped to correct many of the pitfalls that led to disputes 
faced by municipalities and courts prior to the law’s enactment.47 
Another speaker at the public hearing highlighted that, at that time, 
a variety of municipal land use ordinances and actions were under legal 
attack.48 He also emphasized that, although the MLUL “would not 
eliminate all such litigation, the bill is structured to minimize the 
potential for such litigation” and to provide guidance to municipal 
officials and their consultants.49 One of the principal standards that 
would be effectuated by the MLUL was the need for stricter conformity 
between zoning ordinances and the Master Plan.50 
Section 62(a) of the MLUL grants the governing body of each 
municipality the power to zone.51 It states that “after the planning board 
has adopted . . . a [M]aster [P]lan,” a municipality’s governing body 
“may adopt or amend a zoning ordinance.”52 In essence, Section 62(a) 
presents municipalities with two options in enacting or amending a 
zoning ordinance. Under the first option, all provisions of any zoning 
ordinance, amendment, or revision must be “substantially consistent 
with . . . the [M]aster [P]lan or designed to effectuate” the elements of 
the plan.53 
The statute’s second option declares that “the governing body may 
adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in 
whole or part is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate” the 
elements of the Master Plan, “but only by affirmative vote of a majority 
 
46 Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 3 (statement of George Hagermeister, Chairman, 
N.J. State League of Municipalities’ Land Use Study Comm.).  
47 Id. at 4. 
48 Id. at 9 (statement of Stewart M. Hutt, Gen. Counsel, N.J. Builders Ass’n.). 
49 Id. at 9-10. 
50 Statement to S. No. 3054, supra note 45, at 5. 
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2009). 
52 Id. The MLUL also effectively grants zoning boards the power to rezone a parcel by 
granting a use variance. See id. § 40:55D-70. “A use variance allows a landowner to use 
property in a manner inconsistent with permitted uses in the zone in question, such as 
allowing a commercial establishment to locate in a residential zone.” ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS, VARIANCES § 43.01(3)(a) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009). 
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a). 
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of the full authorized membership of the governing body . . . .”54 In 
addition, the governing body must “set forth in a resolution and record[ 
] in its minutes when adopting such a zoning ordinance” its reasons for 
deviating from the Master Plan.55 Section 89 obligates municipalities to 
reexamine and update their Master Plans at least every six years in order 
to keep their zoning current.56 
b.  Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South Brunswick 
The plaintiff in Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South 
Brunswick57 owned a sizeable piece of land located in South Brunswick, 
New Jersey along a commercial highway.58 According to South 
Brunswick’s Master Plan, adopted in 2001 after a two-year study of 
land uses and traffic, the plaintiff’s parcel was zoned as Neighborhood 
Commercial.59 The Neighborhood Commercial or C-1 Zone, which also 
encompasses much of the land along the same highway as the plaintiff’s 
property, includes retail service businesses, professional offices, and 
multi-story mixed-use developments.60 Unlike the plaintiff’s land, most 
of the other parcels in this zone were already developed with “retail 
service businesses and professional offices, including multi-story 
mixed-use development.”61 
In 2003, the plaintiff submitted a site plan application to the 
Planning Board showing plans to build “one professional and two retail 
buildings, one of which was to be a drugstore.”62 Although the plaintiff 
fully complied with the district’s zoning requirements, neighboring 
residents objected to the plan.63 They petitioned the Township Council 
to rezone the plaintiff’s parcel as Office Professional, another type of 
zone only found in one distinct part of town.64 The troubled residents 
highlighted that the area surrounding the plaintiff’s lot was quite 
developed and that allowing the plaintiff to go forward with its plan 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. § 40:55D-89. 
57 Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008). 
58 Id. at 187. 
59 Id. at 187-88. 
60 Id. at 188. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 188. 
64 Id. 
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would lead only to “additional traffic, noise, odor, dust, and pollution.”65 
The Council then forwarded the issue to the Planning Board for 
consideration.66 
Following a public hearing in which representatives of the 
disgruntled residents voiced their objections to the site plan, the 
Planning Board advised the Township Council to rezone the plaintiff’s 
parcel.67 After the Council heard from both the neighboring property 
owners and the plaintiff’s representative, it ultimately adopted an 
ordinance rezoning the plaintiff’s land as Office Professional.68 In an 
accompanying resolution, the Council declared that although the 
rezoning of the parcel was “inconsistent with the Master Plan, . . . it 
[would] significantly protect the health, safety and welfare of the 
residents and motorists in the area.”69 
More specifically, the resolution stated that the rezoning would not 
only “prevent an intensification of traffic congestion at the intersection” 
where the plaintiff’s property is situated, but also thwart an increase in 
the volume of vehicles through a neighboring residential development 
and near an elementary school and park.70 The resolution also stressed 
that existing development in the area in line with the C-1 Zone already 
resulted in an abundance of retail and commercial establishments 
similar to those proposed by the plaintiff.71 It further highlighted that the 
rezoning would be proper because professional offices produce little 
noise, light, or odor, and tend to be open for more limited hours than 
businesses, thus tending to generate less traffic.72 The resolution lastly 
maintained that offices function well as a transition “between 
commercial and residential [uses] because of [their] intermediate 
intensity.”73 
After the rezoning, the plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that the 
zoning amendment “was inconsistent with the Master Plan, was 
arbitrary and capricious, and constituted impermissible inverse spot 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 189. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 189. 
70 Id.   
71 Id.   
72 Id.   
73 Id.  
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zoning.”74 The trial court found that the Township complied with the 
“technical requirements” of Section 62(a) of the MLUL, but invalidated 
the zoning amendment because it found the ordinance to be arbitrary 
and capricious.75 The trial court alternatively held that the zoning 
amendment constituted impermissible inverse spot zoning since the 
Township solely rezoned the plaintiff’s property and there was nothing 
indicating that the revision would advance a comprehensive zoning 
plan.76 
The Appellate Division, after applying a different standard of 
review,77 held that the ordinance was not arbitrary or capricious, and that 
the resolution accompanying the rezoning decision sufficiently 
conformed to the MLUL by providing the Council’s reasoning for 
rezoning the property inconsistently with the Master Plan.78 The panel 
also rejected the trial court’s inverse spot zoning decision by 
distinguishing the case law on which that court relied and finding that 
the parcel’s large size warranted the dissimilar treatment.79 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court then granted certification to review the case.80 
In a majority opinion written by Justice Hoens, the court first noted 
that the governing body clearly complied with the technical 
requirements of the MLUL by forwarding the issue to the planning 
board for its consideration and setting forth in a resolution a series of 
reasons for why it passed the ordinance.81 The court then proceeded to 
 
74 Id. at 189-90. 
75 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 190. 
76 Id. 
77 In holding that it is insufficient for a municipality to base a decision to rezone solely 
on the protestations of neighboring property owners, the trial court cited Cell South of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Windsor, 172 N.J. 75 (2001). Riya 
Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 394 N.J. Super 303, 313 (Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007). The Appellate Division distinguished this decision by emphasizing that the 
Board of Adjustment in Cell South was deciding whether to grant an application for a 
variance. Id. It characterized this as a “quasi-judicial, adjudicative function” obligating the 
Board “to create a record that supported a decision to deviate from established municipal 
policy.” Id. at 314-15. In contrast, the Council in Riya Finnegan was performing a “purely 
legislative function,” which allowed it, “as a duly elected policymaking body, to rely on the 
sentiments of its constituency to formulate municipal policy, including zoning regulations.” 
Id. at 314 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 272 N.J. Super 1, 
12 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)). 
78 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 190. 
79 Id. at 190-91. 
80 Id. at 191. 
81 Id. at 192. 
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emphasize that the Township needed to look further in order to 
“protect[] the rights of the few when the voices of the many speak more 
loudly.”82 The court agreed with the trial court that the Township’s 
rezoning of plaintiff’s property was “arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable.”83 The majority also noted that “[a]lthough the MLUL 
does not define either spot zoning or inverse spot zoning, both concepts 
are imbedded in the principles of sound and comprehensive planning 
that pervade that statutory frameworkFalse”84 The court did not think the 
post-Petlin adoption of the MLUL implied it must reach a different 
result.85 
In agreeing with the trial court that the Township’s zoning 
amendment was inverse spot zoning, the court found that a combination 
of multiple factors made this case an instance of inverse spot zoning.86 
In essence, the court underscored that the zoning change made the 
plaintiff’s property difficult to develop, that the plaintiff could no longer 
implement a site plan that was wholly in accord with the original zoning 
designation, that the change was driven by neighboring property 
owners, and that the new zoning designation was not created for that 
part of town and did not further a comprehensive plan.87 The court 
further noted that the Township took action without the advice of expert 
planners or consultants.88 
Nevertheless, the court maintained it was not implying that it is 
never proper to revise the zoning for what is essentially “the last 
undeveloped parcel in a town or in a discrete geographic area of a 
municipality.”89 The majority asserted that a municipality could revise 
the zoning during a reexamination of the Master Plan or through the 
MLUL’s inconsistency option.90 According to the majority, the MLUL’s 
requirement that the governing body articulate the reasoning behind its 
departure from its Master Plan “serves to prevent the municipality from 
acting in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.”91 
 
82 Id. at 192-93.  
83 See id. at 195. 
84 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197. 
85 See discussion of Petlin, supra Part I(b). 
86 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 197-98. 
90 Id. at 198.  
91 Id. 
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In a dissent joined by Justice Long, Justice Albin accused the court 
of “substitut[ing] its own ‘equitable’ judgment for a lawfully-enacted 
zoning ordinance addressing public safety and quality-of-life issues of 
concern to South Brunswick’s residents.”92 Justice Albin argued that the 
MLUL exhibits the Legislature’s policy of providing municipalities 
with the necessary “breathing space” to fine-tune their zoning in the 
face of “changing circumstances.”93 The dissent asserted that the 
language allowing amendments inconsistent with the Master Plan 
reflects a recognition that zoning may be imperfect or need to “evolve 
to meet a community’s changing conditions and needs,” and that a 
Master Plan should not be “a straitjacket that forbids a municipality 
from improving its laws.”94 He also stressed that the Legislature vested 
the democratically elected governing bodies of municipalities with the 
zoning power and only required that use of that power comply with the 
terms of the statute.95 
Justice Albin additionally contended that the court should not have 
invoked the doctrine of inverse spot zoning here because the instant 
case differs from Petlin in two noteworthy ways.96 The dissent first 
noted that Petlin was decided seventeen months before the existence of 
the MLUL.97 Because the predecessor to the MLUL did not expressly 
allow a municipality to enact a zoning amendment “inconsistent with a 
[M]aster [P]lan,” Justice Albin asserted that the Petlin decision may 
have limited value in deciding more recent cases.98 
Secondly, the dissent argued that Petlin’s facts were not similar to 
the case at hand.99 In Petlin, the court found the municipality’s actions to 
be inverse spot zoning because it gave no real consideration to the 
property’s place in the town’s comprehensive zoning plan and the 
municipality simply designed the zoning changes to alter the use of 
plaintiff’s land.100 Here, South Brunswick took the time to determine 
whether the zoning revision would further the Township’s 
comprehensive development, as well as the health, safety and welfare of 
 
92 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 200 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 201. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 205 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. 
98 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 205 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (quoting Petlin Assocs. v. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 331 (1974)). 
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its inhabitants.101 
Additionally, the court in Petlin considered the rezoning 
questionable on its face because the Township completely disregarded 
the opinion of its own planning engineer.102 The dissent highlighted that 
South Brunswick’s Director of Planning and Community Development, 
on the other hand, opined that the amendment would “clearly lead to 
enhanced protection of the health, safety and welfare of [area] 
residents.”103 Furthermore, the South Brunswick governing body was 
plainly responding to the potentially harmful impact of the original 
zoning designation on the nearby residential development.104 
Justice Albin further questioned the “source of authority” for the 
inverse spot zoning doctrine and averred that judicially created 
doctrines that are equitable in nature “must give way to statutory law.”105 
Lastly, the dissent asserted that because a court cannot override the 
Legislature’s grant of authority to municipalities based merely on its 
own conception of fairness, the MLUL allows a zoning change that is 
inconsistent with the Master Plan to stand so long as it is rationally-
based.106 
III.  RIYA FINNEGAN’S TRANSFORMATION OF THE INVERSE 
SPOT ZONING DOCTRINE 
This Part examines the historical context of inverse spot zoning 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine in Riya 
Finnegan. The first subpart finds that despite the fact that the inverse 
spot zoning doctrine developed in response to the zoning practices of an 
earlier era, the doctrine can still be relevant in determining whether a 
zoning action was arbitrary or capricious. The second subpart further 
concludes that the court’s revitalization of the inverse spot zoning 
doctrine breathes greater life into New Jersey land use jurisprudence by 
providing courts with more guidance. 
a.  The Historical Context of Inverse Spot Zoning 
Spot zoning doctrine principally evolved during the early era of 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (quoting Petlin Assocs. v. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 331 (1974)). 
103 Id. 
104 Riya Finegan, 197 N.J. at 205-06. 
105 Id. at 206. 
106 Id.  
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zoning regulation when municipal governments began facing challenges 
to ad hoc zoning practices that resulted from the states’ original zoning 
statutes.107 One problem with the states’ early zoning legislation arose 
from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act itself.108 Although the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which states began enacting in the 
1920s, commanded that zoning be “consistent with a comprehensive 
plan,” the Act failed to explain both the meaning of that phrase and the 
term “consistent.”109 Additionally, there were few professional planners 
during the 1920s and 1930s, and a relatively small number of genuinely 
comprehensive plans, so that early decisions defined the term 
“comprehensive plan” quite loosely.110 Because it was fairly simple for a 
municipality to prove that its zoning was in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan, it was also easy for local governments to begin 
abusing the zoning power through spot zoning.111 
Another problem with early zoning legislation stemmed from the 
lack of a clearly defined relationship between the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act.112 As noted 
above, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act required that zoning 
actions be “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”113 The Standard 
City Planning Enabling Act, on the other hand, required the creation of 
a local planning commission whose duty it was to create a Master 
Plan.114 These two distinct model laws, however, did not equate the 
 
107 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, THE COMPREHENSIVE OR MASTER PLAN § 
37.03(2) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter MASTER PLAN]. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. § 37.03(1); see also 1 JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE § 14:2 
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that courts have construed the requirement of a comprehensive plan 
“in several different ways.”). 
110
 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, PUBLIC 
CONTROL OF PRIVATE LAND § 1:11 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter PUBLIC CONTROL]; MASTER 
PLAN, supra note 107, § 37.03(1); see also 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, LIMITATIONS UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF ZONING ORDINANCES § 
6:3 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter LIMITATIONS] (“As few of these communities had adopted or 
prepared anything resembling a written plan for development, it is not surprising that the 
courts did not construe the requirement of a comprehensive plan as one requiring a master 
plan formally prepared or adopted.”). 
111 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(1). 
112 Id. § 37.03(2). 
113 Id. (quoting DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3); see 
also Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1155 (1955). 
114 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(2); see also Haar, supra note 113, at 1155. 
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phrase “comprehensive plan” with the term “Master Plan.”115 
Furthermore, the original version of the Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act predated the Standard City Planning Enabling Act by six years.116 
As a result, most local governments adopted zoning ordinances without 
first preparing a comprehensive plan for community development.117 
Adding to the confusion, many courts construed the term 
“comprehensive plan” as simply referring to a set of zoning ordinances 
themselves.118 Therefore, the zoning task preceded and dominated the 
planning task so that zoning ordinances became the planning, instead of 
serving as a short-term implementation device for a comprehensive 
long-term land use plan.119 Moreover, municipalities viewed the Master 
Plan as merely advisory and without any legal effect, so that 
“consistency and the policy of promoting structured, well organized 
development in light of . . . affirmative community goals” was not 
furthered.120 Without clear recognition of the need for development 
according to a comprehensive plan, the risk that zoning would tyrannize 
individual landowners increased drastically.121 
In the 1960s, the desire to eliminate ad hoc zoning and the 
“arbitrary and discriminatory” measures it produced increased as 
municipal governments confronted numerous challenges to zoning 
actions brought by local property owners.122 Many of these complaints 
alleged that a zoning ordinance or revision constituted impermissible 
spot zoning.123 By the 1970s, however, the era of contemporary land use 
controls began to develop.124 This new era evolved not only from the 
 
115 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.  
116 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, 
MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN § 5:1 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
MUNICIPAL PLANNING]. 
117 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107; see also PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 110, § 1:18 
(observing that “communities are quick to adopt zoning ordinances, but less anxious to 
develop a plan”). 
118 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107; see also PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 111 § 1:18 
(“The courts have generally assumed the existence of a plan, or have detected the essence of 
a plan in the zoning ordinance itself.”). 
119 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107. 
120 Id.  
121 Haar, supra note 113, at 1158.  
122 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. § 37.03(3)(a); see also 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF 
ZONING AND PLANNING, BACKGROUND OF POLICE POWER AND ZONING REGULATION § 1:13 
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that numerous states amended their zoning enabling acts during the 
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concerns of the 1960s, but also in response to the improved 
sophistication of the planning profession.125 In addition, environmental 
issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s led states to establish pollution 
control programs that eventually developed into state-controlled land 
use programs.126 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the state’s role in land use 
development continued to increase along with statutory, administrative, 
and judicial consideration of the requirement that land use controls be 
consistent with a comprehensive plan.127 Today, most municipalities 
have both a professional planner and a Master Plan embodying the 
comprehensive plan of the community, or have at least had one in the 
past.128 Thus, there is now a greater expectation that municipalities take 
the time to develop a comprehensive plan for their communities and 
then adhere to that plan in making zoning decisions.129 
In New Jersey, the official beginning of contemporary zoning 
practices took place after the Legislature enacted the MLUL in 1975.130 
The legislative history of the MLUL illustrates that, prior to its 
enactment, New Jersey had yet to update the zoning enabling legislation 
passed in 1928.131 The drafters developed the law in response to the 
numerous challenges to municipal zoning actions faced by local 
governments.132 In requiring stricter conformity between zoning actions 
and the Master Plan, as well as clarifying other procedural aspects of 
land use regulation,133 one of the legislation’s main goals was to 
minimize the potential for legal challenges to local zoning actions, such 
as those alleging impermissible spot zoning.134 Nevertheless, the MLUL 
 
1970s).  
125 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107. 
126 Id.; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 124 (noting that zoning efforts intensified during 
1960s and 1970s to address new concerns and that various state-administered land use 
programs resulted “on the basis that local land regulation was inadequate to manage growth 
and achieve environmental objectives.”). 
127 MUNICIPAL PLANNING, supra note 116; MASTER PLAN, supra note 107. 
128 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(1). 
129 Id. 
130 See discussion of the MLUL, supra Part II(a). 
131 See Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 3 (statement of George Hagermeister, 
Chairman, N.J. State League of Municipalities’ Land Use Study Comm.). 
132 Id. 
133 Statement to S. No. 3054, supra note 45, at 5.  
134 Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 9-10 (N.J. 1975) (statement of Stewart M. Hutt, 
Gen. Counsel, N.J. Builders Ass’n). 
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itself never mentions spot zoning or inverse spot zoning.135 Furthermore, 
Petlin, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s most extended discussion of 
inverse spot zoning, was actually decided approximately seventeen 
months before the MLUL went into effect.136 
Nonetheless, although that law eliminated some of the 
misunderstandings about zoning that gave rise to the creation of the spot 
zoning doctrine, the majority in Riya Finnegan focused on the way in 
which inverse spot zoning doctrine is entrenched in “the principles of 
sound and comprehensive planning” that pervade the MLUL.137 The 
court also stressed that the doctrine emphasizes the arbitrariness of the 
municipal decision rather than whether the municipality singled out a 
particular parcel for beneficial or detrimental treatment.138 In other 
words, the court affirmed that the issue of inverse spot zoning is still 
relevant to whether a municipal decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable despite the passage of the MLUL. 
b.  Interaction with the Arbitrary, Capricious, or Unreasonable 
Standard 
More recently, courts have moved away from applying the inverse 
spot zoning doctrine to zoning challenges and instead solely consider 
whether a zoning action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.139 For 
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Riggs v. Township of Long 
Beach, never mentioned the phrase “inverse spot zoning” when it 
concluded that an amendment “whose sole purpose . . . was to devalue 
the property in order to facilitate eminent domain” was unlawful.140 
Furthermore, many characterize the term “inverse spot zoning” as more 
of an epithet than a judicial doctrine, and at least one scholar argues it is 
a “black spot” on the law in need of removal.141 Critics believe the 
doctrine is unnecessary because courts must invalidate arbitrary or 
discriminatory zoning decisions regardless of whether the plaintiff 
 
135 See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 197 
(2008). 
136 See discussion supra Part I(b); see also Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 205 (Albin, J., 
dissenting). 
137 See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197. 
138 Id.  
139 See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 135-36. 
140 36 DAVID J. FRIZELL, N.J. PRACTICE, LAND USE LAW § 3.11.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) 
(citing Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 612-13 (1988)). 
141 See id.; Reynolds, supra note 17, at 137. 
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characterizes the action as inverse spot zoning.142 
However, the majority in Riya Finnegan clarified the doctrine by 
concentrating on the arbitrariness of the governing body’s zoning 
decision in making its inverse spot zoning determination, essentially 
treating it as a derivative of the arbitrary or capricious standard.143 
Invocation of the doctrine, as characterized by the court in Riya 
Finnegan, may actually help courts more accurately determine whether 
a downzoning was an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the zoning 
power. In explaining why the Township’s actions constituted 
impermissible inverse spot zoning, the Court cited several factors, 
which now provide courts with additional guidance to determine 
whether a rezoning is arbitrary and thus invalid.144  These five factors 
were the fact that the zoning change made the plaintiff’s property 
difficult to develop, that the plaintiff could no longer implement a site 
plan that was wholly in accord with the original zoning designation, that 
the change was driven by neighboring property owners, that the new 
zoning designation was not created for that part of town and did not 
further a comprehensive plan, and that the Township took action 
without the advice of expert planners or consultants.145 
The fact that the municipality downgraded the zoning of the 
plaintiff’s parcel and that neighboring property owners were the driving 
force behind this rezoning suggested that majority interests 
impermissibly dominated individual property rights.146 The presence of 
these facts alone does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the 
amendment was arbitrary, but the existence of the other three factors 
heightens the inference of arbitrariness. For example, the municipality’s 
failure to consult with an expert planner before making a decision 
further implied that it was merely adhering to the neighbors’ wishes 
rather than making an informed judgment about the needs of the 
community.147 
In addition, the plaintiff’s site plan was completely in accord with 
the previous zoning ordinance the municipality had enacted as per its 
Master Plan, while the new zoning did not further any sort of 
 
142 See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 134. 
143 See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197. 
144 See discussion supra Part II(b). 
145 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
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comprehensive plan.148 Therefore, the municipality’s failure to advance a 
comprehensive plan through the zoning amendment also suggested that 
the rezoning was improper. Furthermore, although the MLUL allows a 
municipality to pass a zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with its 
Master Plan, the presence of the other factors suggests that the decision 
to rezone inconsistently was impermissible. In short, these factors 
provide courts with a greater understanding of when downzoning is 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 
IV. INVERSE SPOT ZONING DOCTRINE PROMOTES MORE 
ACCURACY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
This Part discusses the important competing interests at stake in a 
zoning challenge and explains the equilibrium struck by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court between the broad zoning power granted to 
municipalities under the MLUL and judicial intervention. The first 
subpart explains the importance of courts striking a proper balance in 
protecting both individual property rights and the public interest when 
deciding a zoning dispute. The second subpart underscores the way in 
which the Riya Finnegan decision achieves this proper balance. 
a. The Competing Interests in Land Use Jurisprudence 
The most fundamental competing interests in the field of land use 
controls are “the rights of private property owners and the rights of the 
more general public.”149 In Riya Finnegan, the court notes that many 
zoning and land use issues deal with “balancing vested property rights, 
protected by the takings clause, against the larger concerns for the 
general good and welfare of the public as expressed through their 
elected and appointed officials.”150 
On the one hand, protection of individual property interests serves 
important functions in society.151 According to the United States 
Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown,152 “[t]he State’s interest in protecting 
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the 
highest order in a free and civilized society.”153 Aside from promoting 
 
148 See id. 
149 Cordes, supra note 5, at 629. 
150 Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 198. 
151 Cordes, supra note 5, at 638. 
152 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
153 Id. at 471. 
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personal autonomy and privacy, sufficient individual property rights are 
also necessary to protect real estate investments so that land 
development is not excessively chilled or discouraged.154 This is because 
land development can lead to valuable resources, such as housing and 
commercial uses, which, in turn, lead to jobs, goods, and services.155 
On the other hand, broader social and public interests have always 
limited individual property rights.156 Nuisance principles, which courts 
have used to check individual property rights since the early common 
law, hold that “a landowner cannot use property in such a way as to 
harm the property rights of another.”157 This is so because the effects of 
property use unavoidably outstretch property lines and frequently clash 
with other nearby property uses, thereby requiring a reasonable 
accommodation of interests.158 In fact, restrictions on property rights, 
such as zoning, actually enhance the property interests of many 
individuals because “[t]o the extent a property owner values the 
protection from conflicting uses more than the loss of development 
opportunities, there is a sum gain.”159 The United States Supreme Court 
has noted this in its references to the principle of reciprocity, “which in 
part recognizes that regulations often have reciprocal burdens and 
benefits.”160 
Both the competing interests of promoting the general welfare 
through property restrictions and protecting individual property rights 
serve significant societal functions. Thus, it is particularly important 
that cases challenging municipal zoning actions be decided 
competently, so that courts do not improperly subordinate either 
individual property rights or the public interest. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s discussion of inverse spot zoning in Riya Finnegan 
furthers this goal by providing courts with greater clarity with respect to 
deciding whether a municipal zoning action arbitrarily imposes a burden 
on a property owner.161 
 
154 Cordes, supra note 5, at 640. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.; PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 110, § 1:2. 
158 Cordes, supra note 5, at 640. 
159 Id. at 645-46. 
160 Id. at 646. 
161 See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 198-99 
(2008). 
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b.  Balancing Local Zoning Authority and Judicial Safeguards 
A Master Plan is the result of extensive and carefully executed 
background studies of a community, which means that any zoning 
action inconsistent with that plan may be “inconsistent with the 
community’s own judgment about its future.”162 However, the objective 
of zoning and the Master Plan “is not to place the municipality in a 
zoned strait-jacket, but rather to give direction and control to the course 
of its development.”163 As noted earlier, the MLUL requires 
municipalities to reexamine and update their Master Plans at least every 
six years.164 However, this may not necessarily provide municipalities 
with the needed flexibility. Therefore, it may be necessary and 
beneficial for a municipality to exercise its zoning power to amend a 
zoning ordinance in order to achieve the community’s long-term 
goals.165 
The New Jersey Legislature, through the MLUL, thus recognizes 
the importance of some flexibility in zoning.166 Unlike the traditional 
approach to zoning, the New Jersey approach acknowledges that 
circumstances can change by allowing local governments, for good 
cause, to act inconsistently with their Master Plan.167 Nevertheless, “the 
line between flexibility and arbitrariness is a narrow one.”168 For that 
reason, the MLUL also safeguards against arbitrariness by requiring that 
a municipality attach a resolution setting forth its reasoning for any 
inconsistency with the Master Plan.169 This requirement should make it 
clear to a court that a revision is not arbitrary or capricious, but rather 
“represents considered legislative judgment.”170 
Nonetheless, the Riya Finnegan decision makes it evident that a 
municipality’s zoning decision may still be invalid, even if the 
municipality complied with the technical requirements of the MLUL in 
passing a zoning ordinance inconsistent with its own Master Plan.171 The 
 
162 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(ff). 
163 Note, “Spot Zoning” — A Vicious Practice or a Community Benefit, 29 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 740, 748 (1961). 
164 See discussion supra Part II(a). 
165 See Note, supra note 163. 
166 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2009). 
167 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(q). 
168 Haar, supra note 113, at 1169. 
169 MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(y). 
170 See id. § 37.03(3)(ff). 
171 See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 192-93 
WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:40 PM 
538 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
decision further confirms that a municipality cannot simply cite generic 
concerns without any support as to the basis for a zoning amendment, 
and that the courts will invalidate a zoning action as arbitrary or 
capricious if “the reasons expressed by the governing body for its 
decision to rezone [a] parcel fall short.”172 
Ostensibly, Section 62(a) of the MLUL grants each municipality 
broad zoning power because local governing bodies are in the best 
position to analyze their community’s land use situation and to fine-tune 
their Master Plan by making any necessary adjustments. Of course, it is 
also true that there may be valid reasons for mistrusting municipal 
zoning amendments. Despite the existence of New Jersey’s Open Public 
Meetings Act,173 some still believe that zoning decisions “are frequently 
made behind closed doors and only opened to the public after a majority 
of the governing body has already ‘informally’ agreed to approve the 
zone change,” leaving individual property owners with little influence at 
public hearings.174 Consequently, judicial intervention may be necessary 
to protect individual property interests. 
Because judicial intervention encourages courts to second-guess 
local officials and substitute their own judgment for local zoning 
decisions, it is also important that courts not have undue power to 
overturn municipal zoning enactments. By providing a gloss on the 
arbitrary or capricious standard and by giving New Jersey courts more 
guidance, the majority’s use of the inverse spot zoning doctrine in Riya 
Finnegan to overturn a local zoning amendment promotes better 
decision-making by courts in land use decisions. Therefore advances the 
policy of striking a proper balance between individual property rights 
and the public interest. 
However, had recent legislation existed in New Jersey prior to the 
Riya Finnegan decision, the court would not have even heard the case. 
Under the current “Time of Decision Rule,” “a planning board or 
 
(2008). 
172 See id. at 193. 
173 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-6 to -21 (West 2009). Under the Act, also known as “The 
Sunshine Law,” “no public body shall hold a meeting unless adequate notice thereof has 
been provided to the public.” Id. § 10:4-9. The term “public body” means a group of two or 
more persons, “empowered as a voting body to perform a public governmental function 
affecting the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits, or other legal relations of any 
person, or collectively authorized to spend public funds including the Legislature.” Id. § 
10:4-8. The Act’s requirements do not apply to the judicial branch, juries, the Parole Board, 
the State Commission of Investigation or any political party. Id. 
174 See Daines, supra note 1. 
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zoning board of adjustment applies the law in effect at the time it 
renders its decision rather than the law in effect when the issues were 
initially presented.”175 Thus, a governing body can revise its zoning 
ordinance in direct response to an application for development and 
resolve the matter under the amended ordinance.176 
On May 5, 2010, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed a bill 
into law that would effectively prevent a municipality from amending 
its zoning laws in response to an application.177 Under the new law, 
which is to take effect within one year of enactment, a board must 
decide an application for development in accordance with the land use 
regulations that were in effect when the landowner submitted his or her 
application.178 Because of this law’s enactment, inverse spot zoning 
cases, like Riya Finnegan, are unlikely to arise in the future. Thus, the 
victory for land use jurisprudence found in Riya Finnegan may have 
come too late for New Jersey courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the MLUL has since eradicated the misunderstandings 
about zoning that led to the development of the inverse spot zoning 
doctrine, the Riya Finnegan decision shows that the doctrine can still be 
relevant to determining whether a municipal zoning action was arbitrary 
or capricious. Zoning requires a delicate balancing of individual rights 
against the welfare of the community as a whole. However, it can be 
difficult to determine whether a zoning revision arbitrarily burdens one 
of these two conflicting interests. By providing courts with additional 
guidance for determining when a municipal zoning amendment is 
arbitrary or capricious, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s revitalization 
of the inverse spot zoning doctrine promotes better decision-making by 
New Jersey courts faced with zoning challenges. 
Because zoning requires a difficult balancing of important 
 
175 S. Cmty. and Urban Affairs Comm.: Statement to S. No. 82, 2010 Leg., 214th Sess. 
(N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/82_S1.PDF; 
Christopher DeGrezia, Time’s Up for Time of Decision Rule, N.J. ZONING & LAND USE LAW 
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.njlandlaw.com/archives/776.  
176 DeGrezia, supra note 174. 
177 See 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2010/Bills/PL10/9_.PDF; see also S. 82, 2010 Leg., 214th Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/82_I1.PDF. 
178 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010 
/Bills/PL10/9_.PDF. 
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individual and collective interests and raises constitutional concerns, it 
is important for courts to strike a proper balance in deciding zoning 
challenges. In order to serve these interests, courts must also weigh the 
broad zoning authority granted to municipalities against the importance 
of judicial intervention when individual rights are threatened. In 
providing New Jersey courts with more guidance for deciding zoning 
challenges, the majority’s renewal of inverse spot zoning doctrine not 
only aids courts in applying the arbitrary or capricious standard, but also 
promotes greater harmonization between individual property rights and 
the public interest. 
 
